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Between September 2014 and February 2015, the number of Ebola
virus disease (EVD) cases reported in Sierra Leone declined in many
districts. During this period, a major international response was
put in place, with thousands of treatment beds introduced alongside
other infection control measures. However, assessing the impact of
the response is challenging, as several factors could have influenced
the decline in infections, including behaviour changes and other com-
munity interventions. We developed a mathematical model of EVD
transmission, and measured how transmission changed over time in
the 12 districts of Sierra Leone with sustained transmission between
June 2014 and February 2015. We used the model to estimate how
many cases were averted as a result of the introduction of additional
treatment beds in each area. Examining epidemic dynamics at the
district level, we estimated that 56,600 (95% CI: 48,300–84,500)
Ebola cases were averted in Sierra Leone up to 2nd February 2015
as a direct result of additional treatment beds being introduced. We
also found that if these beds had been introduced one month earlier,
it could have averted a further 12,500 cases. Our results suggest
the unprecedented local and international response led to a sub-
stantial decline in EVD transmission during 2014/15. In particular,
the introduction of additional beds had a direct impact on reducing
EVD cases in Sierra Leone, although the effect varied considerably
between districts.
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Significance Statement: Between June 2014 and February 2015,
thousands of Ebola treatment beds were introduced in Sierra Leone,
alongside other infection control measures. However, there has been
criticism of the timing and focus of this response, and it remains
unclear how much it contributed to curbing the 2014-15 Ebola epi-
demic. Using a mathematical model, we estimated how many Ebola
virus disease cases the response averted in each district of Sierra
Leone. We estimated that 56,600 (95% CI: 48,300–84,500) Ebola
cases were averted in Sierra Leone as a direct result of additional
treatment beds. Moreover, the number of cases averted would have
been even greater had beds been available one month earlier.
The 2013-15 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africahas seen more cases than all past outbreaks combined [1], and
has triggered a major international response. In Sierra Leone, where
there have been over 8,600 confirmed cases reported as of 1st Au-
gust 2015, the Sierra Leone and UK governments and NGOs have
supported the gradual introduction of over 1,500 beds in Ebola Hold-
ing Centres (EHCs) and Community Care Centres (CCCs), as well as
over 1,200 beds in larger-scale Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) [2, 3].
As well as the humanitarian value of providing treatment and care to
sick patients, there is a secondary benefit to expanding bed capacity
that is more difficult to quantify; by isolating the ill and removing
them from the community, further infections might be prevented.
Since the peak of the epidemic in Sierra Leone in November
2014, when there were over 500 confirmed EVD cases reported per
week, the level of infection has dropped, with fewer than 100 con-
firmed cases reported per week in February 2015. Although the
nation-wide decline in cases coincided with an increase in the num-
ber of beds available [4], as well as improved case detection, tracing
of contacts and safe burials of patients who had died [3, 5], there has
been criticism of the timing and focus of the international response
in Sierra Leone [6, 7]. To properly evaluate the control efforts, and
plan for future outbreaks of EVD, it is therefore crucial to understand
how many cases were likely averted as a result of the response.
Mathematical models have been used prospectively to estimate
the potential impact of additional beds [8, 9, 10, 11]. However, eval-
uating the effect of control measures retrospectively is more chal-
lenging, because a model must disentangle the reduction in trans-
mission due to improved bed capacity from other factors. Behaviour
changes [12], community engagement, improved case finding and an
increase in safe burials [5] could all have contributed to a reduction
in transmission. Indeed, many Ebola facilities were designed to be
part of a package of interventions, combining treatment beds with
community-based infection control [3].
To estimate how EVD transmission changed as interventions
were introduced, we developed a stochastic mathematical model of
Ebola transmission in Sierra Leone. The model was stratified by
district, and incorporated available data on bed capacity in ETUs,
EHCs and CCCs [13]. As beds were not the only control measure
in place, we also included a time-varying transmission rate in the
model [4, 14], to capture any variation in transmission which was not
explained by the introduction of beds.
As not all new cases in Sierra Leone occur among known
contacts of EVD patients [15], we accounted for potential under-
reporting in our model. In our main analysis, we assumed that 60%
of infectious individuals would be ascertained (i.e. would be reported
and seek treatment), and that it took an average of 4.5 days for these
individuals to be reported [16]. We also included the possibility of
variability in the accuracy of reporting, with weekly reported cases
following a negative binomial distribution. In the model, stochastic-
ity could therefore be generated by both the transmission process and
the reporting process. We assumed infectious individuals who were
ascertained attended EHC/CCCs if beds were available [16]; the av-
erage time between onset and attendance declined over time, based
on reported values for Sierra Leone (Fig. S1). Once test results were
received, patients were transferred to an available ETU; we assumed
this took two days on average. If no beds were available at any facil-
ity, cases remained in the community. The model structure is shown
in Fig. 1, and the full set of parameter values in Table S1.
To allow for a time-varying community transmission rate, we
used a flexible sigmoid function [14, 17]; depending on parameter
values, transmission could be constant over time, or increase or de-
cline. Our model structure therefore made it possible to separate the
reduction in infection as a result of additional treatment beds and
variation resulting from other effects, such as behaviour changes and
implementation of safe burials.
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We used a Bayesian approach to fit the model to weekly EVD
confirmed and probable case data reported in each district of Sierra
Leone [18, 19], and estimate how community transmission varied
over time. We then used the fitted model to simulate multiple stochas-
tic epidemic trajectories, and measured the number of cases that
could have occurred in each area had additional beds not been in-
troduced.
Results
We found that the temporal change in community transmission varied
considerably between different regions (Fig. 2). In Bo and Moyamba,
for example, the level of community transmission remained relatively
flat, whereas in Bombali, Kailahun, Port Loko and Western Area, a
significant decline in community transmission occurred alongside the
reduction in transmission resulting from additional beds. In districts
where there was greater variation in disease incidence, such as Kam-
bia and Kenema, there was considerable uncertainty in our estimates
of the community transmission rate. We found that the decline in
community transmission in each of the 12 districts was strongly as-
sociated with the initial basic reproduction number, but less so with
the total number of cases (Table S2). There was also a geographical
structure to the decline, with a greater drop occurring in districts in
the north and east of the country (Fig. S2).
To measure how many cases control measures may have averted,
we removed all CCC, EHC and ETU beds introduced during the pe-
riod of observation and simulated stochastic epidemic trajectories us-
ing our estimates for the time varying level of community transmis-
sion (Fig. S3). In this scenario, transmission reductions from factors
other than beds, such as reduced infection as a result of behaviour
changes, were still included. Any difference in epidemic dynamics
between this scenario and the original model was therefore only the
result of the removal of treatment beds.
Our results suggest that the increase in beds averted a limited
number of cases in districts without ongoing transmission (e.g. Pu-
jehun) but in districts with large outbreaks – such as Bombali and
Western Area – there would have been thousands more infections
without the introduction of beds. In Kenema, which had highly vari-
able incidence data, there was substantial variation in the background
transmission rate, and hence it was not possible to detect a significant
effect of interventions; the 95% credible interval for cases averted
included zero in Table 1. Across all 12 districts, we estimated that
56,600 (95% CI: 48,300–84,500) cases were averted in total between
June 2014 and February 2015 as a result of additional beds.
As a sensitivity analysis, we also estimated how many cases
would have been averted if 40% or 80% cases were ascertained,
rather than 60% as in our main analysis (Tables S3–S4). If 80%
of cases were ascertained, we estimated that 148,000 (95% CI:
115,000–219,000) cases were potentially averted across all districts
as a result of the introduction of beds; when ascertainment was
40%, the additional beds averted 29,200 (95% CI: 24,500–47,700)
cases. In our main analysis, we also assumed an infectious period of
10.9 days, based on reported time from onset-to-death, and onset-to-
hospital discharge (details in SI Appendix). As some cases may have
ceased to be infectious before discharge, as a sensitivity analysis we
refit the model with a 9 day infectious period, equal to the average
time of infectiousness for fatal cases. Our results did not change sub-
stantially under this assumption (Table S5).
In the model, we also assumed that transmission in each district
was independent of the others. In reality, however, infectious indi-
viduals occasionally travelled between different areas [20]. To assess
how this could affect our estimates of cases averted, we re-simulated
outbreaks using the fitted model, but with additional infectious indi-
viduals introduced at a rate of either one per day or one per week
in each district. When there was an average of one additional infec-
tion introduced per week, our estimates increased slightly (Table S6);
when one additional infection was introduced per day, the increase
was larger, with an estimated 72,900 (95% CI: 61,700–87,900) cases
averted across the country.
As well as measuring the effect of actual control measures, we
were also able to estimate what impact the introduction of beds would
have had earlier in the epidemic. Using the fitted model, we simulated
epidemic trajectories under the assumption that the same numbers of
beds were introduced 4 weeks earlier than in reality (Fig. S4). In
this scenario, we estimated 69,100 (95% CI: 59,500–122,000) cases
would have been averted, which is 12,500 higher than the number we
estimated were actually averted (Table 1).
Discussion
Using a district-level mathematical model of EVD transmission, we
have examined the effect of control measures on epidemic dynamics
in Sierra Leone. In particular, we estimated the effect of the reduc-
tion in community transmission and additional treatment beds on the
number of EVD cases. We found considerable geographic variation:
in some districts, there was a noticeable shift in epidemic dynamics
as a result of changes in community transmission and increased bed
capacity; in other areas, the impact of control measures was less clear.
Although we could measure the number of beds available over
time, there were some additional components of the treatment pro-
cess that were less well known. We used reported data on time to
hospital admission in Sierra Leone to parameterise our model [16, 1],
but this may have varied between districts. We also assumed that indi-
vidual infectiousness remained constant throughout the symptomatic
period. If most transmission occurs in the later stages of infection,
as viral load data might suggest [21], treatment beds could have had
a greater impact on transmission reduction by isolating cases at their
most infectious. This would make our estimate for cases averted as a
result of additional beds conservative.
In the model, patients also sought treatment within their home
district. However, in the early stages of the epidemic, several cases
admitted to the ETU in Kailahun were from outside the district [20].
This may have increased the benefits of bed introduction, by reduc-
ing transmission in locations without treatment beds; it may also have
impeded control efforts, by making contact tracing and safe burials
more difficult [20]. In addition, faster turnaround time in lab test-
ing may have reduced the time spent in EHC/CCCs before moving
to ETUs [22], and led to more EHC beds becoming available per
day. While there were occasional details of the number of patients
in isolation in different districts in Ministry of Health situation re-
ports [15], overall these data were incomplete. If more complete
EHC/CCC/ETU data were available, it would be possible to validate
our model estimates for the number of cases hospitalised over time.
Our results also emphasise the highly variable nature of Ebola
transmission. Even in retrospect, it was difficult to measure the ef-
fect of changes in transmission and additional beds on the number
of EVD cases in some areas. It is also likely that the introduction
of Ebola facilities helped stimulate other infection control measures,
including safe burials and improved contact tracing [3]. In our simu-
lated scenarios, we removed only treatment beds; in practice, a lack
of treatment centres would also likely have led to fewer safe buri-
als, and hindered investigation of cases’ contacts. With better data
on the timing and role of different interventions – both clinical and
non-clinical – it would be possible to obtain more accurate estimates
about the precise contribution of different factors to the dynamics of
EVD in Sierra Leone. In particular, it is important to understand how
awareness of EVD influences behaviour during an outbreak [23], and
how this change in behaviour might affect disease dynamics [24, 25].
In the absence of such data, we concentrated on the impact of
additional treatment beds alone; we assumed the level of community
transmission declined regardless of the number of beds. An alterna-
tive approach would be to assume that transmission would remain at
the same level as was in the early phase of the epidemic [9, 10]. As
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our estimate of the basic reproduction number, R0, was above one
in most districts initially (Table 1), epidemic theory suggests the out-
break would have continued to grow exponentially in these regions
under the assumption of no change in transmission, until there were
insufficient susceptible individuals for the infection to persist. The
corresponding number of cases averted would therefore have been
extremely large. However, it not clear that R0 would have remained
unchanged for such a long period of time. Evidence from past EVD
epidemics indicates that changes in behaviour can reduce transmis-
sion independently of external interventions [23, 26].
Even under our conservative assumption that the introduction of
EHC/CCC/ETUs reduced transmission only by isolating more pa-
tients, we estimated that around 57,000 cases were averted in Sierra
Leone as a result of additional treatment beds. Given that the case fa-
tality rate of Ebola in Sierra Leone is near 70% [16], this suggests that
the scale-up of local and international efforts to combat the epidemic
is likely to have averted around 40,000 Ebola deaths in the country
between June 2014 and February 2015. Moreover, the reduction in
Ebola transmission will also have halted the damaging secondary ef-
fects of the epidemic, including the suspension of access to maternal
health and vaccination programmes [27, 28].
Materials and Methods
Transmission model. To model the effect of treatment beds on Ebola transmission,
we used an SEIR framework that incorporated ETUs and EHC/CCCs [8]. We used
a relatively simple framework as we were fitting to only a single case time series for
each district [14]. In the model, individuals started off susceptible to infection (S).
Upon infection with Ebola they entered an incubation period (E), then at symptom
onset they became infectious. As there is evidence that not all Ebola cases have
been reported [1], we assumed that only a proportion r of newly infectious individu-
als would eventually be ascertained and seek treatment. This category was denoted
IA. The other proportion 1− r would not be ascertained; this group were denoted
IM . We assumed that it took an average of 1/τr days for ascertained cases to be
reported to the Ministry of Health. After becoming symptomatic in the model, cases
in IA sought health care in EHC/CCCs (H). They took an average of 1/τH days
to attend these centres. If no EHC/CCC beds were available, the patient would to
attend an ETU. If no ETUs bed were available, the patient remained infectious in the
community until the infection was resolved (R) i.e. they had recovered, or were dead
and buried. Once in an EHC/CCC, patients were tested for Ebola (we assumed this
took an average of 2 days) then progressed to an ETU if a bed was available. Pa-
tients stayed for an average of 1/τD days in an ETU before the disease was resolved
(either through recovery or death). The probability Ebola-positive individuals were
admitted to an EHC/CCC, pH , when they attended the centre depended on whether
the centre was full or not. We assumed that some patients attending EHC/CCCs
were Ebola-negative, which had the effect of reducing the available bed capacity by a
factor α. The probability Ebola-positive individuals were admitted to an EHC/CCC
upon attendance was therefore:
pH =
{
1 if αBH > H
0 if αBH = H
[ 1 ]
where BH denotes the total capacity of the EHC/CCCs. Likewise, the probability
individuals were admitted/transferred to an ETU was:
pU =
{
1 if BU > U
0 if BU = U
[ 2 ]
where BU denotes the capacity of the ETUs. We assumed that the population was
initially fully susceptible to infection. We assumed the average latent period, 1/ν
was 9.4 days, and the average duration of infectiousness in the community, 1/γ,
to be 10.9 days in our main analysis; as a sensitivity analysis we also considered an
infectious period of 9 days. The average time from onset-to-outcome for individuals
that seek treatment was assumed to be 11.3 days (details in SI Appendix).
We obtained EHC/CCC/ETU opening dates from the Humanitarian Data Ex-
change [13], and cleaned ambiguous or missing dates using reports from WHO, MSF,
UNICEF and other partners. If the precise date of opening, or change in capacity was
not known, we used the first date for which we could find confirmation of the centre
being open with a given capacity. This could have made our analysis more conserva-
tive, as some centres may in reality have opened earlier than we presumed. One field
study in Bo estimated that 54% EVD cases made it into the district-level situation
reports [29]; in turn the numbers of cases in these reports are typically slightly lower
than the numbers in the final WHO patient database [1]. Therefore we made the
assumption that 60% of symptomatic cases were ascertained in our main analysis [4],
and considered 40% and 80% ascertainment as a sensitivity analysis. We assumed
that it took an average of 4.5 days for these cases to be reported after symptom on-
set [16] In the model, the time between onset and attendance of EHC/CCCs declined
from 4.6 days to 1.3 days between July 2014 and April 2015 (Fig. S1); the average
duration spent in EHC/CCC before moving to an ETU was 2 days; and the average
time spent in an ETU was initially 11.3-4.6-2=4.7 days. We assumed that 50% of
beds in EHC/CCCs were occupied by Ebola-negative patients [15] (i.e. α=0.5). We
also allowed community transmission to potentially vary over time by modelling the
transmission rate at time t, βt, as a sigmoid [14, 17]:
βt = βˆ
(
1− a2
1 + e−a1(t−aτ )
)
[ 3 ]
where βˆ, a1, a2 and aτ were parameters to be fitted. We modelled transmission dy-
namics using a stochastic model, with environmental noise acting on the transmission
rate [30]:
dSt = − βtξt St(I
A
t + I
N
t )
N
dt [ 4 ]
dEt = βtξt
St(I
A
t + I
N
t )
N
dt− νEtdt [ 5 ]
dIAt = rνEtdt− pHτHIAt dt− (1− pH)(1− pU )γIAt dt [ 6 ]
+ (1− pH)pUτHIAt dt [ 7 ]
dINt = (1− r)νEtdt− γINt dt [ 8 ]
dHt = pHτHI
A
t dt− pUτUHtdt− (1− pU )τFHtdt [ 9 ]
dUt = (1− pH)pUτHIAt dt+ pUτUHtdt− τDUtdt [ 10 ]
dRt = γI
N
t dt+ τDUtdt+ (1− pH)(1− pU )γIAt dt [ 11 ]
+ (1− pU )τFHtdt [ 12 ]
dXt = rντrEtdt [ 13 ]
Here N is the total population size, Xt is the cumulative total of ascertained Ebola
cases, βt is the rate of transmission at time t, and ξt is a lognormal (and hence
positive) noise term with mean 1 and variance σ:
log(ξt)dt = σdW − σ
2
2
dt [ 14 ]
where W is Brownian motion [30]. Model structure and parameters are shown in
Fig. S6. The model was simulated using the Euler-Maruyama method with intervals
of dt=1/10 days. Population size N for each district was taken from Sierra Leone
census data [31].
Model fitting. We fitted the model to weekly incidence data (i.e. number of new
confirmed and probable cases per week) from Sierra Leone reported in the WHO pa-
tient database [1]. As described in a previous study, we also used data from the Sierra
Leone Ministry of Health [15] when more recent case data were not available in the
WHO database [4]. We excluded Bonthe district from the analysis as there were small
numbers of confirmed or probably cases, which were spaced several weeks apart. It is
therefore unlikely there was sustained transmission in this area. For each of the other
districts, we used the first reported week of sustained transmission (i.e. there were
cases in that week and the following week) as the first data point in the time series.
The last data point for all districts was 2nd February 2015, as the number of cases
had declined to minimal levels in most areas by this point. In the model, incidence in
week t, denoted xt, was given by the difference in cumulative reported cases over the
previous 7 days i.e. xt = X(t)−X(t−7). As situation reports were only issued
on w out of 7 days in some weeks, we scaled these weeks by a factor κt = w/7.
We also included the possibility of variability in the accuracy of reporting in the situa-
tion reports. We assumed the number of reported cases in week t followed a negative
binomial distribution with mean xtκt and variance κt(1−κt)xt+φ2κ2tx2t [4].
Model fitting was performed using a particle MCMC algorithm [19] with an
adaptive multivariate normal proposal distribution [32]. For each district, we fitted:
the initial number of infective individuals (including both ascertained and missed) at
the start of the outbreak, I0 = I(0); the volatility of the transmission rate, σ;
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over-dispersion of reporting, φ; the initial transmission rate βˆ; and the two shape
parameters for the transmission rate sigmoid, a1, a2 and aτ . We used uniform
positive priors for all parameters, with the exception of a2, which we constrained to
the interval (−∞, 1) by imposing reflective boundary conditions during parameter
resampling. Posterior estimates for R0 = β0/γ, I0, σ, φ and the 4 sigmoid pa-
rameters (taken from 50,000 MCMC iterations, following a burn-in period of 10,000
iterations) are given in Figs. S6–17; the posterior distribution of the sigmoid is shown
in Fig. 2 (blue line and shaded region). The model was implemented in R version
3.1.3, and parallelised for multiple districts using the doMC library [33, 34].
Estimating cases averted. To estimate the number of infections averted as a
result of control measures, we first estimated the total number of infections (i.e. the
cumulative number of individuals who leave the S compartment) up to 2nd February
2015 using the posterior parameter estimates from our fitted model. We define this
as the ‘baseline scenario’. Next, we assumed that the community transmission rate
varied as in the baseline scenario, but no additional EHC/CCC/ETU were introduced.
This was equivalent to assuming that changes aside from bed introductions – such
as shifts in behaviour, increased number of safe burials, improved infection control –
would have happened regardless of whether additional beds were made available. We
ran 1000 bootstrap simulations under this scenario, and compared the total number
of infections with the baseline scenario. In our main analysis, we assumed that 60%
of cases were ascertained (i.e. r=0.6). To test how sensitive our results were to
this assumption, we also refitted the model to each district with r=0.4 and 0.8, and
used these fitted models to estimate the number of cases averted in the two different
scenarios above. The results are given in Tables S3–S4.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This work was funded by the Research for Health in Hu-
manitarian Crises (R2HC) Programme, managed by Research for Humanitarian As-
sistance (Grant 13165). AJK acknowledges support from the RAPIDD program of
the Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, and the
Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health.
1. World Health Organisation (2015) Ebola response roadmap situation reports.
apps.who.int/ebola/en/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-20-may-2015.
2. Whitty C, et al. (2014) Tough choices to reduce Ebola transmission. Nature 515.
3. World Health Organisation (2014) Key considerations for the implementation of Com-
munity Care Centres. WHO report.
4. Camacho A, et al. (2014) Temporal Changes in Ebola Transmission in Sierra Leone and
Implications for Control Requirements: a Real-time Modelling Study. PLoS Currents
Outbreaks 7.
5. Nielsen CF, et al. (2015) Improving Burial Practices and Cemetery Management Dur-
ing an Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic. Sierra Leone, 2014. MMWR. Morbidity and
mortality weekly report 64:20–27.
6. Gulland A (2014) UK’s plan to build community care centres for Ebola patients is
questioned. BMJ 349.
7. BBC News (2015) Ebola crisis: Government response ‘far too slow’. http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-31366626.
8. Kucharski AJ, et al. (2014) Evaluation of the Benefits and Risks of Introducing Ebola
Community Care Centers, Sierra Leone. Emerging Infectious Diseases 21:393–399.
9. Lewnard JA, et al. (2014) Dynamics and control of Ebola virus transmission in
Montserrado, Liberia: a mathematical modelling analysis. The Lancet Infectious Dis-
eases.
10. Meltzer MI, et al. (2014) Estimating the future number of cases in the Ebola epidemic
– Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.
11. Merler S, et al. (2015) Spatiotemporal spread of the 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus
disease in Liberia and the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions: a com-
putational modelling analysis. The Lancet Infectious Diseases.
12. Funk S, Knight GM, Jansen VA (2014) Ebola: the power of behaviour change. Nature
515:492–492.
13. The Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX) (2014) West Africa: Ebola Outbreak. Avail-
able from: https://data.hdx.rwlabs.org.
14. Camacho A, et al. (2014) Potential for large outbreaks of Ebola virus disease. Epi-
demics.
15. Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation (2014) Ebola virus disease - situation
report. http://health.gov.sl/?page_id=583.
16. WHO Ebola Response Team (2014) Ebola virus disease in West Africa — the first 9
months of the epidemic and forward projections. New England Journal of Medicine
371:1481–1495.
17. Chowell G, Hengartner NW, Castillo-Chavez C, Fenimore PW, Hyman JM (2004)
The basic reproductive number of Ebola and the effects of public health measures:
the cases of Congo and Uganda. J Theor Biol 229:119–26.
18. King AA, de Celle`s MD, Magpantay FM, Rohani P (2015) Avoidable errors in the
modeling of outbreaks of emerging pathogens, with special reference to Ebola. Proc.
R. Soc. B 282.
19. Andrieu C, Doucet A, Holenstein R (2010) Particle Markov chain Monte Carlo meth-
ods. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)
72:269–342.
20. Dallatomasina S, et al. (2015) Ebola outbreak in rural West Africa: epidemiology,
clinical features and outcomes. Trop Med Int Health 20:448–54.
21. Towner JS, et al. (2004) Rapid diagnosis of Ebola hemorrhagic fever by reverse
transcription-PCR in an outbreak setting and assessment of patient viral load as a
predictor of outcome. Journal of virology 78:4330–4341.
22. Bentley N (2015) Sierra Leone Ebola labs project – beating the outbreak at source.
Public Health England Blog.
23. Hewlett BS, Amola RP (2003) Cultural contexts of Ebola in northern Uganda. Emerg-
ing infectious diseases 9:1242.
24. Ferguson NM (2007) Capturing human behaviour. Nature 466:733.
25. Funk S, Gilad E, Watkins C, Jansen V (2009) The spread of awareness and its impact
on epidemic outbreaks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106:6872.
26. Breman J, et al. (1978) The epidemiology of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Zaire, 1976.
Ebola virus haemorrhagic fever (Pattyn, SR ed.) pp 85–97.
27. Hayden E (2015) Maternal health: Ebola’s lasting legacy. Nature 519:24–26.
28. Takahashi S, et al. (2015) Reduced vaccination and the risk of measles and other
childhood infections post-Ebola. Science 347:1240–1242.
29. Roberts L (2014) Day 54: Surveillance at odds with justice and the little people.
https://pfmhcolumbia.wordpress.com.
30. Ionides E, Breto C, King A (2006) Inference for nonlinear dynamical systems. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103:18438.
31. National Statistics of Sierra Leone (2004) 2004 population and housing census.
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Census/ssl_final_results.pdf.
32. Roberts GO, Rosenthal JS (2009) Examples of adaptive MCMC. Journal of Compu-
tational and Graphical Statistics 18:349–367.
33. Revolution Analytics (2014) doMC package. https://cran.r-project.org/package=
doMC.
34. R Development Core Team (2015) The R Project for Statistical Computing. https:
//www.r-project.org/.
4 www.pnas.org — — Footline Author
Table 1. Estimated number of cases averted up to 2nd February 2015 as a result of additional
treatment beds. For each district, we estimated the median number of additional cases that
would result in the original fitted model, with community transmission rate varying as Fig. 2. We
then considered two scenarios: additional EHC/CCC/ETU beds introduced as in reality, and the
same additional beds introduced 4 weeks earlier, and estimated the number of cases averted in
each scenario (95% credible interval in parentheses). The median posterior estimates for initial
R0 (95% credible interval in parentheses), and total numbers of additional EHC/CCC/ETU beds
introduced in each district are shown for comparison.
District Initial R0 Beds introduced Additional beds Beds 4 weeks earlier
Bo 1.6 (1.4–1.7) 124 6,310 (4,150–9,040) 6,820 (4,730–9,620)
Bombali 5.2 (2.9–7.9) 506 6,480 (1,800–22,900) 7,630 (2,320–34,500)
Kailahun 8.4 (5.3–16.2) 123 3,650 (2,250–6,750) 4,580 (3,290–7,460)
Kambia 1.5 (1.4–3.6) 55 545 (2–4,430) 748 (4–15,400)
Kenema 7.4 (2.1–19.4) 75 1 (0–10,500) 3 (0–23,800)
Koinadugu 0.7 (0.3–1.1) 92 35 (11–104) 97 (48–206)
Kono 1.6 (1.4–1.9) 83 1,570 (928–2,430) 2,060 (1,490–3,060)
Moyamba 1 (0.9–1.2) 34 130 (77–197) 237 (145–366)
Port Loko 1.8 (1.6–2.2) 546 3,850 (853–13,400) 5,660 (1,180–26,900)
Pujehun 0.5 (0.2–1.2) 24 11 (2–34) 22 (6–55)
Tonkolili 3.5 (1.3–8.4) 349 568 (140–2,900) 959 (272–5,940)
Western Area 2.5 (2.2–2.8) 960 32,600 (25,500–40,200) 39,200 (32,100–47,100)
Total 2971 56,600 (48,300–84,500) 69,100 (59,500–122,000)
S E IA 
R IM 
EHC/
CCC 
ETU 
Fig. 1. Model structure. Individuals start off susceptible to infection (S). Upon infection
with Ebola they enter an incubation period (E), then at symptom onset they become infectious;
these individuals either eventually become ascertained (IA) or do not (IM ). Individuals who
are ascertained initially seek health care in EHC/CCCs (or ETUs if these are full); if no beds are
available, they remain infectious in the community until the infection is resolved (R) i.e. they
have recovered, or are dead and buried. Patients in EHC/CCCs are transferred to ETUs once
they have been tested for Ebola, which takes an average of 2 days. Patients remain in ETUs until
the infection is resolved. We assume the latent period is 9.4 days, the average time from onset
to EHC/CCC attendance declines from an initial value of 4.6 days (Fig. S1), and individuals
who do not seek treatment are infectious for 10.9 days on average (details in SI Appendix).
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Fig. 2. Community transmission and bed capacity in Sierra Leone over time. Blue line shows
estimated median community transmission rate, shaded area shows 95% credible interval (right
hand axis). Black dots show weekly reported confirmed and probable cases in each district up
to 2nd February 2015 (left hand axis). Gray line shows median number of cases generated from
1000 simulations of the fitted model, with 50% credible intervals given by dotted gray lines and
95% intervals sgiven by dashed lines. Solid red line, ETU bed capacity; orange line, EHC/CCC
bed capacity.
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